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Coordination between Objective 2 Programming and National/Regional Initiatives IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE Danish Regional Growth Fora
SYNTHESIS
The issue of coordination between European and national/regional policies for regional development is pertinent in most Member States to achieve synergies or at least reduce negative interference, with practices ranging from formal to informal to virtually nonexistent. In Denmark, the mode of coordination has changed profoundly in recent years, effectively moving from informal and voluntary forms of coordination to a situation where coordination is statutory and highly formal.
This was achieved by generalising an informal but long-standing approach found in some regions (including North Jutland) which brought the administration of European and regional policy initiatives under the same political and administrative umbrella. In practice, this has made a Structural Funds style partnership the organisational core of a new nation wide regional policy.
While this was undertaken via the 2005 Business Development Act, the actual working of the new partnerships as vehicles of joint strategy making and consensual implementation has been more uneven, reflecting different existing patterns between key stakeholders, especially the new local and regional authorities, and has had varying degrees of success with integrating private sector representatives in the political process.
Key lessons are that given the right political conditions, even in a consensual democracy like Denmark, major reforms can be brought about, especially when long-term piloting has been undertaken through European programmes which have effectively demonstrated the strengths of a particular approach. Of course, building trust within partnerships is also a long-term process which cannot be expected to take place in a matter of months.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Country: Denmark
Objective:  Objective 2


I. DESCRIPTION OF THE APPROACH
Overall objective and purpose
The issue of coordination between Structural Funds programmes and national/regional programmes exists in all Member States and is addressed in different ways through more or less segmented implementation channels and more or less formalised forms of coordination. Since the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds, European regional development programmes in Denmark have been handled through channels which were formally separate from those used by domestic initiatives, albeit involving many of the same organisations and stakeholders. With the 2005 Business Development Act which was part of a major reform of local government which came into force in 2007, European funding was mainstreamed into a unitary administrative system heavily inspired by the partnership principle governing the Structural Funds. Domestic regional policy now operates in a European manner where funding from the Structural Funds is one of several sources which can be used to finance regional development activities.
Description of activitiesTwo main directions of the changes to domestic regional policies can be identified. First, unifying many relatively small initiatives promoted policy synergies and made it possible to economise with scarce resources, thereby possibly increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of regional development initiatives. This is good not only for the regions themselves but also for the overall competitiveness of a small open economy in a globalised world. Second, the introduction of a mandatory partnership at the regional level enhanced the legitimacy of interventions by ensuring that all relevant public and private partners were involved in developing strategy and selecting projects. These two initiatives were particularly relevant in the Danish situation where this model is being made compulsory throughout the country. This is in contrast to the previous situation where most Structural Funds activities operated only in certain geographically designated areas and regional development was a voluntary ad hoc task of the intermediate level of government.
Beneficiaries
Once the difficulties involved in introducing institutional and procedural changes are addressed, this integration is expected to make life easier for regional-level programme administrators and project applicants because it creates a single gateway to regional policy support. Ultimately, the aim of strengthening economic development in all Danish regions is to benefit citizens.
Expected impact and main results
This initiative was expected to increase synergies with regard to administrative procedures, a simplification for both project promoters/applicants and for programme administrators in and beyond the 2007-13 programming period. The main result was the creation of a new integrated institutional framework for regional policy in Denmark, focusing on competitiveness and cohesion throughout the country, using a partnership format inspired by that of the Structural Funds, and combining resources to achieve synergy in policy implementation. A perhaps unforeseen side effect was to give much greater public prominence to issues of regional development and regional policy. This not only reflects the new ways of handling this particular policy area but also the fact that local government reform removed a great many functions from the intermediate level of governance. This made regional development the second most important activity of the new regions, although in financial terms it is still dwarfed by health care as the most important local policy area.
Community value added
Undoubtedly the experience with partnership in the context of Structural Funds programming and regional level experiments with the integration of other policies in the same institutional setup, especially in regions such as North Jutland, was important in providing concrete evidence of the potential for policy integration and regional consensus building. Although bringing in social partners in the policy making process is not uncommon in Denmark, the range of stakeholders and the depth of their involvement in, for example, the Objective 2 processes suggests that the new institutional arrangement was inspired by previous Structural Funds experiences.
II. POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONTEXT
Following the abolition of the centrally administered Danish regional aid package in 1991, the central government moved away from regional policy implementation and took on a coordinating role. At the sub-national level, county councils with tax-raising powers (the Amter) became increasingly active in regional development. The Danish setup for Structural Funds administration over the 2000-06 period did not fit easily in a simple centralised/decentralised dichotomy but can perhaps best be described as ‘co-ordinated decentralisation’, which gradually evolved since the introduction of Structural Funds programming in the late 1980s. This relatively stable and low-key position of regional development policy was affected by three, closely related central government initiatives. First was a major reform of local government which originated in a 2002 Commission but only came fully into force on 1 January 2007. This reform reduced the number of local authorities from 275 to 98, and 14 county councils to five large regions with health care as their far most important area of responsibility. Second, a new Business Development Act in 2005 gave the new regions statutory responsibility for economic development through statutory partnership bodies (Regional Growth Fora) funded by local and central government.  Third, a new institutional setup integrated local, regional, national and European economic development activities within a single, programme-based, policy structure. While this new system has applied in full only since 2007 and its emergence has been driven by factors other than regional policy (health, administrative simplification), programme-based, central-regional coordination was a recurring issue for much of the 2000-06 period, and the new institutional set-up for regional development policy clearly reflected long-standing policy concerns at the national level.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
Design and planning 
During the 2000-06 period, each EU programme complement region in Denmark had its own organisational setup. County councils were the key actors for both Structural Funds implementation and the non-statutory economic development activities undertaken in most regions as part of domestic regional policy. This created strong informal links between the two sets of policies. In addition, regional subcommittees dedicated to Structural Funds issues played a role in ensuring that domestic and EU practices were brought together, both because the mandatory Executive Committees which recommended projects for support invariably comprised key actors at the regional level, and because the extended Regional Steering Committees (such as the North Jutland Development Fund) had an even wider membership and responsibility for regionally driven initiatives. This could happen by giving the regional Development Fund a central role in the EU programme as a body that was not only involved in Structural Funds programming but also constituted the main channel through which the county sponsored its own regional policy activities. While the Danish approach entailed distinct organisational arrangements for the handling of Objective 2 programmes, at the regional level individual projects were assessed in a process that also involved administrative and political bodies responsible for domestic development activities. In this way, the formal separation in the Danish administrative approach of domestic and European regional policy was reduced in practice through informal coordination.
The reasons for taking the model for administering the Structural Funds and making it a central part of local government reform in 2005 do not reflect a systematic evaluation of previous experience, although key administrators at the national level certainly knew of research conducted at IQ-Net and Aalborg University on partnership experiences. Although this was important in influencing how the principles were implemented, the regionalisation of business development support activities and the use of partnership as the key organisational principle, it can only be fully explained through reference to the political context in which it occurred. Taken together, this regionalisation and partnership constitute the largest reshaping of Danish regional policy since the termination of regional investment subsidies in 1991.
Not surprisingly, the official reasoning behind the solution adopted involved well-rehearsed arguments about the virtues of bottom-up regional policy. However, a quest for policy effectiveness and efficiency does not necessarily lead to the emergence of business development as an inclusive regional task organised along partnership lines. From the outset, the technocratic Commission on Administrative Structures (Strukturkommisionen), established to analyse the need and options for local government reform prior to the party-political process, only considered business development briefly on the grounds that it was not a statutory task of sub-national government. The analysis of the Commission largely reiterated the need for improved horizontal and vertical coordination, much in line with central government initiatives from the 1990s onwards. As a result, the subsequent inclusion of regional policy in the negotiation process was based on other types of political reasoning. It is generally agreed by the actors involved in Danish regional policy and local government reform that the elevation of regional policy to a statutory task at the regional level was greatly facilitated by party-political considerations within the governing centre-right coalition. Given that the Conservative party had been sceptical about maintaining an intermediate tier of government in a small country like Denmark, the basic aim of government negotiators had been to make the new regional functions as narrow as possible (health plus a few more functions). In this context, business development fit the bill as a small policy area in terms of money and staff and was likely to appeal to the centre-left opposition parties. From the perspective of regional development, it is worth noting that although the new regions were generally much larger than their predecessors and would therefore in principle facilitate larger strategic initiatives, their geographical boundaries reflect health care considerations (one large university hospital at the centre of (most of) them) rather than coherent regional economic units. At least four of the five new regions (with the possible exception of North Jutland) are internally heterogeneous and/or have borders that cut through existing socio-economic patterns of interaction.
Likewise the centrality of the partnership principle and its translation into a blueprint for the new statutory Regional Growth Fora emerged in the ensuing government proposal which was a starting point for party-political negotiations. In terms of administrative rationalisation, an obvious reason for this was to create an organisational platform that could live up to Structural Funds regulations and thus integrate both European policy programmes and mushrooming subnational activities, but more pragmatic political reasoning is also credited as having a role. Apart from securing the presence of relevant competences in the decision-making process as a supplement to the mainly health-oriented members of the new Regional Councils, a partnership approach also had the political advantage of bringing on board other actors with vested interests in this policy area such as local authorities and private sector representatives. In so doing, it increased the general legitimacy of regional business development policies and made the activity more ideologically palatable for the governing centre-right coalition.
Management, monitoring and evaluation 
The performance of the Regional Growth Fora is monitored both administratively and politically. A joint system of indicators for regional socio-economic development was established, and so-called partnership agreements between central government and each of the Regional Growth Fora were introduced as part of the so-called globalisation strategy of central government.
Governance: partnership and leadership 
The 2005 Business Development Act gave the new regions statutory responsibility for economic development through partnership bodies, the Regional Growth Fora. The new institutional setup integrated local, regional, national and European economic development activities, and thus created a new nodal point in the public governance of regional development. Each of the five new regions is statutorily obligated to establish at least one Regional Growth Forum. A total of six Fora are now operating; the geographically composite Capital Region established two Fora, one for metropolitan Copenhagen and one for the peripheral Baltic island of Bornholm. The composition of these bodies is defined by the Act, and their membership consists of persons proposed by the new regional councils, local government, the private sector, social partners (including trade unions) and knowledge institutions within the regions. The main roles of the new Fora are to monitor regional development, elaborate strategies to facilitate growth, and recommend projects and activities for funding to the elected regional councils or, in the case of Structural Funds funding, to a national authority. The Business Development Act institutes a form of dual-key control where both the elected council and the partnership Fora can veto each other’s ideas. The complexity of the setup is further increased by the fact that neither the regions nor the Regional Growth Fora have powers of taxation but operate on the basis of block grants from the national level, a statutory financial contribution from local authorities in the region, and European funding allocated by the central government. Moreover, neither the regions nor the Regional Growth Fora are allowed to implement policies but rather must act through separate legal entities, e.g. bodies set up with or jointly by local authorities. Finally, the Business Development Act also defines the aims and methods of regional policy within the new setup. In terms of overall strategies, the focus is clearly on economic growth in general and the four ‘growth drivers’ identified by the OECD:  innovation, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), entrepreneurship and human resources. At the same time the regions are also required to promote development of tourism and, more importantly, to give particular consideration to localities designated by the central government as peripheral on the basis of a composite socio-economic index.
For Structural Funds programming in Denmark this means that focus of activities is firmly on the four growth drivers (also with regard to tourism-related projects), and that – 35 per cent of all Structural Funds spending must benefit designated areas - and to the promotion of tourism development. The instruments used by the regions in pursuance of these goals do not include direct financial grants to individual firms but must be for the benefit of an ‘open group’ of firms within the region, and direct financial grants to individual firms are only possible in the most peripheral areas including small islands.
Although formally equal in terms of bringing different kinds of knowledge and expertise to the proceedings, the distribution of roles in the partnership is in fact asymmetric with some partners either representing potential beneficiaries (business organisations, trade unions) or even being potential direct beneficiaries themselves (universities and other knowledge institutions), while other partners also bring funding to the table (local authorities, the region). Moreover, the role of regional government as provider of the secretariat for the Regional Growth Fora also increases the leverage of the region on the decision-making process, although establishing a small executive committee with regional, local, private and knowledge institution members has acted as a counterweight in this respect.
It is too early to say anything conclusive about the partnership dynamics of the new Regional Growth Fora (research is currently ongoing at the universities in Aalborg and Roskilde), but clearly the main challenges in the early years have been:
	The redrawing of administrative borders which implied new social geographies in the sense that organisations and individuals articulating private business interests are also affected. Only two of the six Regional Growth Fora saw no or very limited geographical change as result of local government reform. Moreover, the extent to which partnership-type Fora were involved in economic development activities differed between the smaller pre-2007 regions. Especially in regions which incorporated few of the old Objective 2 areas, all partners have been on a steep learning curve.
	The relationship between different tiers of government where the new setup created an interesting pattern of mutual dependency between the local and regional tiers of government. The former is automatically a financial contributor to the Regional Growth Fora through a statutory development charge, yet at the same time neither the regions themselves nor the Regional Growth Fora can implement policies. In effect they will depend on either stand-alone business development bodies or the economic development units of the local authorities.
	The role of private sector representatives in the Regional Growth Fora was the subject of considerable debate. Especially in the early stages, these representatives often vented their dissatisfaction with the territorial politics of local authorities and their rivalry with the regional level, and, of course, the extensive administrative apparatus around strategy development and approval of individual development projects.
Innovative elements and novel approaches to implementation
The most important innovative element in the new approach, initiated by central government as part of local government reform, was the adoption of an extended partnership approach as the organisational principle for the development and implementation of regional policy in Denmark. This was clearly inspired by Structural Funds practices which had existed in some Danish regions for some years and which were now made statutory throughout the country in a form balancing the different tiers of government and other actors so the situation would be conducive to the working of the partnership. In the old Objective 2 regions, many of the partners were already working closely together on regional development issues, and while procedures were obviously adjusted to fit the new institutional setup, a considerable degree of continuity was evident. In other regions this proved to be much more difficult. For example metropolitan Copenhagen was unable to establish a temporary Regional Growth Forum to prepare for the permanent Forum.
Compared to pre-2007 regional policy, from the beginning the new bodies systematically established a very strong internet presence with many aspects of their work easy to follow in great detail. Despite this, in broad terms the actual development activities are not qualitatively different from previous policies, including those pursued under the 2000-06 Structural Funds programme period. 
Geographically, the new institutional setup is different from the previous one. The overriding focus is to strengthen growth in regions across the entire country, but at the same time commit extra resources for this purpose to lagging localities designated as peripheral areas. Compared to the original top-down approach of the 1980s or the Structural Funds programmes of the early 1990s, the currently designated areas are fairly small with only eleven percent of the Danish population. Still, compared to the most recent round of Structural Funds programming this actually constitutes a small increase. The political agreement on local government reform stipulated that the peripheral areas should be targeted by the same share of European funding as in the previous programming period, but as these 35 percent must can be spent not just within but also for the benefit of and not necessarily within the designated peripheral areas, the new setup is in keeping with an idea evident in central government thinking for some time: it is important not just to stimulate autarchic economic activities in the peripheral areas but also to link these areas to nearby centres of urban growth. Monitoring from the national level may prevent prolonged discussions about the extent to which peripheral areas should be prioritised, and perhaps the presence of a considerable contingent of private sector members in the Regional Growth Fora will also reduce the risk of localism more generally dominating decisions, such as those related to individual development projects.
The current strategy documents of the Regional Growth Fora display a large degree of continuity in relation to regional and tourism policies in the preceding period despite concrete changes reflecting the new administrative borders. This is hardly surprising given the general priorities entailed in the 2005 Business Development Act and the fact that more than two years of strategy development have coincided with massive changes of organisational structures and associated fluctuations in terms of staff. However, in practice it also means that conflicting aims and methods now coexist within the new framework. While the general regional policies still emphasise modernisation of existing firms in addition to duplication and creativity, tourism-related firms receive some priority support for marketing the region and its destinations to prospective tourists. In other words manufacturing firms must promote their products themselves, while tourism firms can still get by on limited marketing budgets because public money is being used to promote their services
Key implementation obstacles and problem-solving practices
The main lessons with regard to creating statutory partnerships for regional development throughout Denmark can be summarised under two headings: partnership building and policy coordination.
With regard to partnership building, the main lesson is, unsurprisingly, that the creation of trust takes time. Some Regional Growth Fora experienced hiccups on the way to building solid partnerships. The difficulties were either associated with reluctance to move away from existing party political and territorial practices or because new partners found it difficult to adjust to the reformed setup. Although the pattern across regions varies, adjustments are gradually taking place, perhaps driven by concerns about the absorption of the available funds.
With regard to policy integration, it is clear that although the new set-up has created a single gateway for applicants and administrators, the underlying existence of different administrative procedures (e.g. demand for documentation) still exists. Thus, it could be argued that while including the Structural Funds in the Regional Growth Fora entails substantial additional resources, their relatively burdensome administrative procedures influenced the operation of the Regional Growth Fora both in terms of their administrative procedures with regard to regional/national initiatives and the decision-making procedures adopted by the partnership bodies themselves. This of course implies more coherence between national and European policies for regional development, and hence more consistency and predictability for both applicants and administrators – but at the price of increasing the administrative demands on project champions/owners and thereby making regional policy in Denmark less directly oriented towards small and less professional private firms and public bodies.


IV. KEY RESULTS
From an institutional perspective, the introduction of a new organisational framework in the form of the Regional Growth Fora has been the main immediate result. The extent to which the two official rationales – policy coordination and partnership building – will materialise is difficult to determine after only two years of functioning. In formal terms, of course, partnerships have been established throughout the country, but the extent to which these new bodies have started to function as consensus-building partnerships (as opposed to e.g. vehicles of interest mediation) is uneven at the moment and likely to change over time, although disputes about the (lack of) private sector influence have become much less pronounced. With regard to policy coordination, the new Regional Growth Fora have generally given priority to larger projects of a more focussed nature (something which has also been facilitated by their larger geographical scale), and many of these combine European and other sources of funding. However, based on the evidence available it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which this reflects the availability of different sources of funding and, indeed, the change from an informal to a more formal form of coordination between different programmes supporting regional economic development. In terms of procedures, however, the convergence between national and European policies for regional economic development has undoubtedly increased consistency and predictability for both applicants and administrators, but at the same time made policy measures less directly oriented towards small private firms and public actors.
V. SUSTAINABILITY AND TRANSFERABILITY
As the Regional Growth Fora were the result of local government reform, their fate has often been associated with that of the new regions which, predictably, have already come under political attack for failing in their primary role as managers of the Danish health care system efficiently. However, even if health care was eventually made a central government responsibility and the intermediate regional tier of government terminated, the arrangement of Regional Growth Fora as independent entities may well survive on a stand-alone basis. It provides a decentralised way of delivering tailor-made support for economic development that actively involves social partners, and, of course, is capable of administering Structural Funds programming. The transferability of the model relies heavily on the existing institutional and political setting, although some of the success factors would appear to be of a rather generic nature.
VI. CONCLUSIONS: MAIN SUCCESS FACTORS
The reasons why it has been possible to completely revamp the organisational framework surrounding Danish regional policy and make it a partnership-based statutory task for the regional level can be summarised as follows:
	the presence of regional-level experience (e.g. in North Jutland) with involvement of a broad partnership in the administration of both Structural Funds programming and regional initiatives, setting an example that clearly provided inspiration for national-level policy administrators
	the need for central government to have a  minor policy area that could be offered the centre-left parties as a bargaining chip in order to ensure the widest possible support for local government reform
In other words, long-term piloting through Structural Funds programming has been important in bringing the partnership principle to the fore also in nationally-initiated policies for regional development in Denmark, but still this positive ‘technical’ experience with a particular form of policy-making only became a general principle of Danish regional policy when political circumstances with little relation to this policy area created a window of opportunity.
Once the reform was instigated, success factors were related to the specific regions, hence the uneven outcomes across the country. A key factor was patience with regard to using the partnership as a means to build trust and consensus, and the ability to break with traditional hierarchical thinking and local,  territorial politics.
VII. CONTACT DETAILS
Contact details
Pernille von Lillienskjold 
Head of Department, Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority 
phone +45 35 46 64 33 
e-mail: pvl@ebst.dk, www.ebst.dk
Date of this information
March 2009 
For an overview of the process, see the contribution of Halkier to Bukve/Halkier/de Souza (eds): New Nordic Regionalism, Aalborg University Press 2008.
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